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INTRODUCTION
Changes in knowledge and technology, the growth of the elderly
population, and rising public expectations will continue to increase
medical care costs. Due to these trends, more stringent rationing
of medical care is inevitable. Future rationing must involve a blend
of approaches, including: cost-sharing with patients (price ration-
ing); administrative limits on technological expansion, reimbursable
services, and provider remuneration (explicit rationing); and
discretionary allocation of services within the constraints of
established budgets (implicit rationing).' Each approach has
advantages as well as liabilities. The health care rationing debate
focuses on what relative weight each of these approaches should
receive.
Dependence on price rationing approaches is likely to deter
appropriate as well as inappropriate medical care procedures with
a larger deterrent effect on the poor. Also, while some explicit
administrative constraints are essential to set the parameters of care
and to avoid uncontrollable escalation of costs, dependence on
explicit rationing approaches is likely to result in insensitivity to the
complexity of clinical care, to the rapidly changing character of
medical knowledge, to the uncertainties of the care process, and to
the wide range of situations, needs, and preferences of patients.
In contrast, an implicit rationing approach offers the most
realistic and appropriate way to allocate services. Because patient
populations are heterogeneous, many medical interventions involve
uncertainty, and the clinical decisionmaking process is iterative
(using information obtained from the relationship between
professional and patient), an effective health care rationing system
must take into account the need for flexible physician response to
numerous unprovided-for circumstances. Implicit rationing allows
for needed sensitivity to variance by relying on clinical discretion,
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1 See David Mechanic, Approaches to Controlling the Costs of Medical Care: Short-
Range and Long.Range Alternatives, 298 NEW ENG.J. MED. 249, 249 (1978).
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thus strengthening the potential for professional/patient interaction
and making unwarranted withholding of efficacious services less
likely. Implicit rationing can be strengthened by appropriate
grievance procedures, professional peer review, and the ultimate
threat of malpractice to provide deterrents to an inappropriate
decision to withhold medical care.
I. THE CONTEXT OF THE RATIONING DEBATE
As medical care costs in the United States escalate and account
for a growing proportion of gross national product, health care
rationing, once commonly viewed as unthinkable, has become an
increasingly respectable response. The popular conception of
rationing is based on the American experience of food and gasoline
rationing during World War II, in which specified shares of a
limited resource were distributed. Fixation on such an extreme
example obscures the fact that substantial rationing occurs every day
in the distribution of the limited resources of all publicly supported
services. 2 This de facto rationing is so common in everyday reality
that it is hardly thought of as rationing at all.
3
2 See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Idea of Right as a Social and Legal Concept, 27J.
Soc. IssuEs 189, 194 (1971) (stating that there are no free goods and that even free
speech and justice are rationed). Friedman notes:
[T]he right to use the courts has no theoretical limit. But there are only so
manyjudges and lawyers and courts .... Courts are crowded; this materially
affects the reality of the right to use courts. But the litigating public has,
over the years, adjusted the supply of courts more or less to the level of
tolerable demand.
Id. at 194-95.
3 The lack of awareness of hidden subsidies and funding limits is not unique to
the health care rationing situation but describes much of the intersection between
marketplace and social policy. See Alain Enthoven, Health Tax Policy Mismatch,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1985, at 6, 9-11. Most middle class Americans fail to recognize
the extensive subsidies they receive for health care, housing, and other services.
Thus, they perceive that housing subsidies are solely given to the poor, failing to
recognize the much larger housing subsidies to the middle class through the
opportunities to deduct interest for home loans on their tax return. See Neil Howe
& Phillip Longman, The Next New Deal, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1992, at 88, 93
(reporting that the present government tax policy provides greater subsidies to
higher-income taxpayers). Alain Enthoven estimated that revenue loss in 1986
resulting from favorable tax treatment of employer contributions for medical
insurance and medical care was approximately $47 billion. See Enthoven, supra, at 8.
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A. Background of Rationing
Throughout most of medical history, the availability of medical
services was substantially rationed by the ability to pay, by the
availability of number and types of practitioners and facilities in
different geographic areas, and by patient compatibility with
physicians' research needs and practice inclinations.4 To the extent
that the market for medical care was primarily private, the ability of
people to pay for medical care set strict constraints on its consump-
tion. Although many physicians provided considerable charity care
to patients who lacked resources, financial concerns constrained the
extent of such charity efforts.
5
The growth of health insurance and large government pro-
grams-particularly Medicare and Medicaid-in the post World War
II period has fundamentally changed health care utilization by
separating the patient's ability to pay from the availability of medical
services. Once one gains eligibility or pays health insurance
premiums, the received entitlements are only tangentially related to
out-of-pocket expenditures, if at all. This change has weakened the
influence of economic constraints on patient behavior, skewing the
consumption of certain medical services.
Currently, rationing occurs mostly through the design of health
insurance coverage and reimbursable providers, rather than by the
patient's ability to pay. Individual and administrative choices are
made among coverage options for competing service benefits, types
of facilities and practitioners, and contexts of care, including
hospitals, nursing homes, outpatient settings, and the home.
Initially, most insurance covered hospital care and only a limited
scope of possible health care needs. While these insurance
programs expanded, they generally continued to limit coverage in
such areas as mental health, dentistry, outpatient prescription drugs,
and podiatry.6 For instance, less than half of the elderly's health
4 See DAVID MECHANIC, FUTURE ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE
RATIONING OF MEDICAL SERVICES 3-5 (1979).
5 Cf. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 157-62,
386-88 (1982) (finding that hospitals with greater budgetary restraints decreased the
amount of charity care that they provided, although hospitals had traditionally been
the primary providers of charity care).
,See Robert B. Friedland, Medicare: Meeting the Health Care Needs of the Elderly,
ISSUE BRIEF (Am. Ass'n of Retired Persons Pub. Pol'y Inst., Washington, D.C.),July
1991, at 5-6 (listing services not covered, including custodial nursing home care,
outpatient prescription drugs, routine dental services and dentures, most preventive
care, routine foot care, homemaker services, vision exams and eyeglasses, and hearing
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care costs are covered by Medicare despite the magnitude of
Medicare expenditures as a percentage of national health care
expenditures.
7
Rationing also results from how care is organized. The
structural organization of medical care has inherent imbalances,
such as the unequal availability and distribution of tertiary care
facilities, specialized hospitals, nursing homes, outpatient programs,
rehabilitation facilities, and various types of reimbursable practitio-
ners. These imbalances limit the services available to persons in
some geographic areas.8 Such constraints are further reinforced in
most insurance programs by cost-sharing, through co-insurance and
deductibles, limits on the frequency and intervals within which
certain services can be utilized, and maximum allowable expendi-
tures on various types of benefits.
These methods of rationing had been obscured by the rapid
growth of health insurance and health expenditures during the post-
World War II period. Financial incentives created by Medicare
reimbursement and tax policies stimulated the expansion of
hospitals and development of new nursing homes.9 The number
of nursing home beds, for example, grew from fewer than 570,000
in 1963 to approximately 1.4 million by 1976.10 As medical knowl-
edge and new technologies expanded, public expectations of the
quality of health care increased. Because most people had
greater access to care than previously, and certainly more than
tests and hearing aids).
7 For the elderly, Medicare covered only 85% of hospital costs and 64% of
physician services in 1987. See HENRYJ. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION:
FINANCING AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE 62 (1991). Moreover, Medicare pays only 2% of
nursing home expenditures, estimated to be $47.7 billion in 1990. See ROBERT M.
BALL, BECAUSE WE'RE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER 15 (1989). In 1981, Medicare paid only
45.3% of the per capita bill for the elderly. See Karen Davis, Aging and the Health-Care
System: Economic and Structural Issues, DAEDALUS, Winter 1986, at 227, 230.
8 See Karen Davis, Equal Treatment and Unequal Benefits: The Medicare Program, 53
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 449,471 (1975) (noting that elderly persons in the West
receive 32% more Medicare support for inpatient hospital care, 43% more physicians
benefits, and two-and-one-half times the support for extended care facilities than
those in the South).
9 See ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 293-305, 339 (1989) (describing how the availability of
Medicare reimbursement and tax exempt bonds for raising capital fueled hospital and
nursing home capital projects).
10 See NATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND
WELFARE, PUB. No. (PHS) 78-1232, HEALTH: UNITED STATES, 1978, at 351 (1978).
11 See Leslie Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health Care, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1881 (1992).
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earlier generations, access inequalities and limitations on the
services available were not generally recognized. Moreover, because
insurance mechanisms were separate from the supply of facilities,
programs, and practitioners, the public did not see an obvious link
between the theoretical availability of entitlements and difficulties
in obtaining them. Despite the public's ignorance, rationing was
in fact occurring.
New medical care financing made available by Medicare,
Medicaid, and other government programs altered the supply of
services. These programs were biased toward the reimbursement of
technical procedures, in contrast to providing cognitive and
counseling services characteristic of primary care. 12 Large inequal-
ities in access persisted by geography, urban or rural residence, and
the demographic characteristics of varying population groups1
3
Thus, resource limitations moderated the pace of growth, but not
to the extent of requiring "tragic choices."
14
Today the need for rationing is clear. Medical expenditures
have escalated dramatically since federal Medicare and Medicaid
programs were initiated in 1965, and they will continue to grow due
to rapid advances in science and technology, 15 a growing popula-
tion of elderly with a high prevalence of chronic disease, 16 increas-
12 See STARR, supra note 5, at 384-86.
13 INSTFIrT E OF MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE IN A CONTEXT OF CIVIL RIGHTS 4-13
(1981) (finding inequities in the provision of health care to social and ethnic
minorities and suggesting that more data be collected to evaluate possible discrimina-
tion against handicapped persons); Davis, supra note 8, at 463-80 (finding disparities
in receipt of Medicare benefits based on income, race, and geographical factors).
14 See Guido Calabresi, Commentaiy, in ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE 48, 48-55
(Laurence R. Tancredi ed., 1974) (discussing tragic choices in the context of the
doctor and patient having unequal information). Calabresi has defined "tragic
choices" as
situations where there is no right decision. Assuming that a society has
made some kind of decision as to how many kidney machines it will
produce, how many soldiers it will need for a limited war, or how many
births it can tolerate, how does it decide, explicitly or implicitly, who gets
the kidney machines, who gets picked to serve in that limited war, who gets
to have children.
Id. at 53-54.
15 See Daniel R. Waldo et al., National Health Expenditures, 1985, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV., Fall 1986, at 1, 1-10.
16 See DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY
227 app. (1987) ("[M]ost studies indicate that an increase in longevity has been
matched by an increase in chronic illness."); Lois M. Verbrugge, Longer Life but
Worsening Health? Trends in Health and Mortality of Middle.aged and Older Persons, 62
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 475, 485 (1984).
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ing patient expectations, 17 and an expanding population of health
professionals and physicians, who to some degree create demand for
their own services.18 The crux of the current debate is not
whether we should ration care. Rather, having recognized rationing
is inevitable, the debate focuses on the appropriate mix of rationing
devices to constrain supply and allocate it fairly, in a manner
consistent with an acceptable quality of care.
This debate does not exist in a vacuum; health care in the
United States is a public endeavor to a significant degree. The
government, in some form, directly pays for more than 40 percent
of all health care costs and an even larger proportion of the costs
for inpatient care and the uses of expensive technology.
19
Through its tax and reimbursement policies, the government
substantially subsidizes the purchase of health insurance and the
capacity of nonprofit and private institutions.20 Future health care
reforms may require employers to provide health insurance to their
workers, a form of indirect taxation. Thus, government has a large
and growing stake in the shaping of future constraints and an
examination of possible approaches to rationing becomes necessary.
B. Approaches to Rationing
One alternative strategy for rationing health care is to increase
the proportion of the cost paid by the patient, thus reducing the
cost borne by government (price rationing). With the emphasis on
competition during the 1980s, substantial increases in cost sharing
were introduced across the entire health care sector.2 1  One
17 See supra note 11.
18 See, e.g., VICTOR FUCHS, THE HEALTH ECONOMY 146 (1986) (finding that the
proposition that "an increase in the supply of surgeons results in an increase in
demand" is "strongly supported").
19 See Helen C. Lazenby & Suzanne W. Letsch, National Health Expenditures, 1989,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Winter 1990, at 1, 1-2 (stating that in 1989,
government accounted for 42% of health expenditures [Medicare, 17%; Medicaid,
10%; and other government programs, 15%] and that government also accounted for
53.5% of all hospital services).
20 See Enthoven, supra note 3, at 9-11.
21 Cost-sharing can be imposed through increased premiums, deductibles and
coinsurance, and payments at the time of services such as for each physician or nurse
visit, a common practice in HMOs. See Katharine R. Levit et al., National Health Care
Spending Trends: 1988, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1990, at 171, 178 (reporting that the
proportion of full-time employees with annual deductibles in employer-sponsored
health insurance of $100 or more increased from 8% in 1980 to 40% in 1988).
Similarly, deductibles under Medicare have substantially increased in the 1980s. See
Katharine R. Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 1990, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
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obvious advantage of price rationing is that it reduces the financial
burden on government or insurer by requiring patients to share an
increased part of the cost. Additionally, price rationing is motivated
by the theoretical belief that if individuals are required to pay part
of the costs of their medical care, they will consider the need for
care more carefully and choose services more selectively, thus
reducing trivial and inappropriate demands for care.22 General
support for this proposition comes not only from economic theory,
but also from early results of the RAND Health Insurance Experi-
ment (HIE), which demonstrated that copayment significantly
reduced the demand for ambulatory care.23 Subsequent research
from the HIE found that copayors did not differentiate between
appropriate and inappropriate care.24 Thus, one could conclude
that copayment reduced demand for care, but not in a discriminat-
ing or rational way. Copayment also deters the poor from seeking
care to a greater extent than the affluent, even though poverty is
associated with more illness and a greater need for care.
25
The second alternative strategy for rationing health care is
through explicit legislative mandates and administrative decisions.
Such explicit constraints are common and include definitions of
eligibility for program enrollment, decisions about the services and
procedures to be reimbursed, criteria defining eligibility for
specified services, and definitions of reimbursable providers and
eligible location of service provision. When explicit rationing is
REV., Fall 1991, at 29,41 (stating that expenditures have increased from $180 in 1980
to $560 in 1989). In 1991, the deductible for inpatient hospital care was $628 for
each benefit period. See Medicare Program, Inpatient Hospital Deductible and
Hospital and Skilled Nursing Facility Coinsurance Amounts for 1992, 56 Fed. Reg.
58,061, 58,062 (1991). This deductible was increased to $652 in 1992. See id. at
58,061.
22 See, e.g., Paul B. Ginsburg & Larry M. Manheim, Insurance, Copayment, and
Health Services Utilization: A Critical Review, in ISSUES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS 153, 153
(Roice D. Luke &Jeffrey C. Bauer eds., 1982) (stating that insurance companies have
felt that "if consumers agree to pay part of the cost of insured health care, they will
not increase their consumption so much, and will moderate insurance rates").
23 SeeJoseph P. Newhouse et al., Some Interim Results from a Controlled Trial of Cost
Sharing in Health Insurance, 305 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1501, 1504 (1981).
24 See Kathleen N. Lohr et al., Use of Medical Care in the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment: Diagnosis- and Service-Specific Analyses in a Randomized Controlled Trial, 24
MED. CARE SI, S36 (Supp. 1986); Albert L. Siu et al., Inappropriate Use of Hospitals in
a Randomized Trial of Health Insurance Plans, 315 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1259, 1264 (1986).25 See David Mechanic, Socioeconomic Status and Health, in PATHWAYS TO HEALTH:
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL FACTORS 13 (John P. Bunker et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter
PATHWAYS TO HEALTH] (citing studies showing that poor health "cluster[s]
significantly in the lowest socioeconomic groups").
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used, regulators may describe in detail the services that will be
available and the criteria for their allocation, and monitor care
processes by preliminary review, second opinions, and audits to
assure that clinicians follow specified algorithms. Explicit rationing
also refers to procedures limiting the expansion of facilities such as
certificates of need, regulations concerning the acquisition and use
of technology, and budgeting decisions constraining the develop-
ment and diffusion of technologies. Limitations of technical
capacity and facilities results in queuing, a pervasive and effective
rationing approach.
26
One advantage of explicit rationing is that a central authority
can develop sophisticated data systems and appraisals of the
scientific literature to inform funding decisions about technologies
and services. 27 The central authority can draw on high levels of
scientific and professional expertise, and can synthesize large
quantities of pertinent data.28  Such a centralized authority,
properly staffed, can make more scientifically sophisticated choices
than individual professionals who proceed on the basis of a
fragmentary command of scientific evidence and who are strongly
influenced by their personal clinical experience.
29
Significant progress is being made, using complex multivariate
techniques, in analyzing clinical data to predict therapy outcomes
for critically ill patients. 30 Some of these models predict more
accurately than experienced clinicians, 1 and pressures will in-
26 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BLANK, RATIONING MEDICINE 80-84 (1988) (describing
various types of rationing).
27 See Robert H. Brook, Health, Health Insurance, and the Uninsured, 265 JAMA
2998, 2999 (1991).
28 See William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate
and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1197,1198 (1988) (noting that the
Health Care Financing Administration has been developing such a capacity in the
management of Medicare). Similarly, the creation of the new Agency for Health Care
Policy and Research in the Public Health Service reflects the commitment to develop
this capacity to monitor and evaluate the health care delivery system and the
effectiveness of care.
29 For a classic description of the medical clinical perspective, see ELIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 164-
68 (1970).
30 See William A. Knaus et al., Short-Term Mortality Predictions for Critically Ill
Hospitalized Adults: Science and Ethics, 254 SCIENCE 389, 389 (1991) (advocating the
use of clinical data to improve the evaluation of the outcomes of life-sustaining
therapy which "often succeeds in postponing death but may be ineffective at restoring
health" and may result in life many would find "worse than death").
31 See id. at 391 (reporting that their study revealed that objective predictions of
patient mortality were significantly more accurate than subjective clinical judgments).
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crease to use such systems and constrain physician decisionmaking.
As these new techniques become more sophisticated, they will be
powerful aids in medical assessment, but are unlikely to substitute
for an individual professional's judgment. As William Knaus and
his colleagues note:
Physicians have also been hesitant to apply probability estimates
to a particular patient. The physician always knows elements of
the patient's condition that are not in the predictive model, and
rarely is there evidence to show that the additional information is
irrelevant. Knowledgeable physicians are also concerned over
whether current patients and treatments are truly comparable to
those in the predictive model and whether the identical therapies
were used for patients in the database.
32
Clearly, central authority must set broad constraints on the
definition of reimbursable services and technologies if costs are to
be constrained in our world of limitless possibilities. Detailed
rulemaking, however, is too distant from the realistic contingencies
of disease, the complexities of comorbidity, and the diversity of
personal and family situations, to extend to specific clinical
decisions under the conditions of uncertainty that characterize
much of medical care.3 3 In a large and culturally heterogeneous
society it is especially difficult to anticipate the varying needs,
expectations, and tastes of patients and their families, and the
varying and shifting family structures and social situations that are
pertinent to the choices people make and their effective care.
This leads to the third alternative, implicit rationing, in which
regulatory authorities set general constraints on expenditures,
entitlements, and expensive technologies, but the actual allocation
of services is determined within doctor/patient transactions. The
English National Health Service, the Canadian Medicare System,
and HMOs in the United States reflect implicit rationing to some
32 Id. at 390.
33 The editor of the New England Journal of Medicine describes the situation as
follows:
In many ways the diagnostic process resembles the start of a chess game:
After one or two moves (one or two symptoms), the number of possible
moves (diagnostic possibilities) is usually enormous; in both chess and
medicine, the object is to win, but the challenge is to make the right move
in the right direction at the right time. Unfortunately, the route is almost
never clear in advance.
Jerome P. Kassirer, Clinical Problem-Solving-A New Feature in the Journal, 326 NEw
ENG.J. MED. 60, 60 (1992).
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extent. Despite information problems, implicit rationing at the level
of the individual physician within broad constraints is the best
option. Because a strong relationship often develops between
doctor and patient in critical illness situations, resulting in a high
level of trust and a high quality of communication between them,
the individual physician is in the best position to make good health
provision judgments. The disadvantage of implicit rationing is that
it may erode trust between the doctor and patient by assigning the
doctor a dual responsibility of choosing between an individual
patient and other patients' priorities. While troublesome, this
disadvantage is more palatable than the lack of understanding and
insensitivity likely to result from explicit rationing decisions in a
micro-management mode by persons removed from the complicated
situations and emotions associated with illness and the help-seeking
process.
II. THE CASE FOR IMPLICIT RATIONING
Implicit rationing, despite some obvious limitations, offers the
best opportunity to allocate care effectively in the context of
uncertainty, a changing knowledge base, and heterogeneity in the
American population and in patterns of illness. In developing my
argument in support of implicit rationing, I will first devote
considerable space to elucidating the special character of medical
care, its uncertainties, and the lessons we might learn from
international experience. Before proceeding, however, I should
make clear how this analysis differs from the "regulatory model"
suggested by Robert Blank in this Issue.
34
Blank's presentation confounds the issue of universal entitle-
ment with the processes of allocating finite medical resources.
Universal entitlement, a concept that I strongly endorse, is compati-
ble with a variety of allocative mechanisms and its endorsement
provides little information on how priorities are to be established
and adjudicated. Blank's presentation of the regulatory model
assumes reasonably stringent economic constraints without
specifying the mix of explicit and implicit rationing that would be
most desirable.
Blank's challenge of "lifestyle choice" and his endorsement of
Secretary Sullivan's health rhetoric simplifies extraordinarily
34 See Robert Blank, The Regulatoiy Model: Rationing Health Care, 140 U. PA. L.
REv. 1573 (1992).
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complex behavioral issues.35 He also neglects the extent to which
many of the risk factors conducive to poor health are not under the
control of individual volition,3 6 and to which others, such as
smoking, obesity, and substance abuse, are difficult to modify even
with sustained personal motivation.3 7 While it is desirable to have
incentives that encourage risk reduction and sustain personal
desires for behavior change, achieving life style change, particularly
in respect to the most damaging behavioral patterns, is a difficult
and uncertain endeavor.
Blank also makes a point of the fact that a small proportion of
medical care utilizers account for a significant proportion of all
expenditures, and views this as an issue of "just distribution of
scarce resources." 38 This position obscures the difference between
routine primary care and sophisticated specialized care. A dispro-
portionate use of sophisticated services should not be surprising
since in any given year only a small proportion of the population
suffers critical illness. That small proportion of the population is
not necessarily the same people who are using the most sophisticat-
ed resources at other times.39 Primary care is a valuable service
that needs further development but it is misguided to regard it as
a service that competes with sophisticated specialized care. Our
efforts should be directed to developing a balanced system of care
with appropriate linkage between primary medical care and more
specialized technical services.
Blank further places great emphasis on government not only as
5 See id. at 1577.
36 See, e.g., Diana B. Dutton & Sol Levine, Socioeconomic Status and Health:
Overview, Methodological Critique, and Reformulation, in PATHWAYS TO HEALTH, supra
note 25, at 29,58 (noting that "people may want very much to follow desirable health
practices but are impeded by circumstances they cannot control"); David Mechanic,
Promoting Health, SOCIETY, Jan-Feb. 1990, at 16, 16 (noting that instead of
scrutinizing community structure and everyday activities, "[c]urrent efforts [at health
education] still function largely at the margins").
37 See, e.g., PREVENTION IN HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY (James C. Rosen & Laura S.
Solomon eds., 1985) (compiling literature that documents the difficulty of changing
risk behaviors).
8 Blank, supra note 34, at 1578.
89 Severity of illness is the best predictor of physician and hospital utilization.
Even among the elderly, who have a higher prevalence of illness than younger people,
63% had no or only one episode of hospitalization during an eight-year period. Less
than 11% were hospitalized in four or more of the eight years, and these patients had
the highest probability of dying. Even in this group, the vast majority (71%) survived
the eight-year period studied. SeeJana M. Mossey et al., The Consistency of Formal
Health Care Utilization: Physician and Hospital Utilization, in AGING AND HEALTH CARE
81, 85-86 (Marcia G. Ory & Kathleen Bond eds., 1989).
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a regulator but as "the only agent with the authority to influence
public values and, thus, create a framework for setting limits."
40
He argues that "government has a responsibility to educate the
public both as to the links between lifestyle choices and health, and
the need to moderate expectations." 41 In contrast, I believe that
Americans do not accept government as the "only agent with the
authority to influence public values," and traditionally have been
distrustful and suspicious of government, particularly central
government. In reference to health affairs, I believe that the public
trusts their physicians far more than any public authority and would
find implicit rationing within a regulated system more consistent
with their needs and preferences. To elucidate this, we must first
consider the special character of medical care.
A. The Substance of Medical Care
In the typical medical encounter the patient presents a variety
of complaints to a physician who, by selectively questioning the
patient, seeks to identify an underlying pattern and to diagnose it.
The diagnosis operates as a working hypothesis,,suggesting varying
degrees of information about the etiology and course of the
problem as well as approaches to treatment. If the patient's
problem is clear, and fits a well-established diagnostic theory, then
the diagnosis itself offers a prescription for how the physician
should proceed in specific treatment and overall care manage-
ment.
42
The difficulty is that many problems do not allow clear diagnos-
tic determinations, or are complicated by comorbid conditions.
Often the treatment plan is uncertain because preferred modalities
are not supported by clear scientific evidence. Kerr White, a
distinguished observer of the medical care process, observed that "it
is still the case that only about 15 percent of all contemporary
clinical interventions are supported by scientific evidence that they
do more good than harm."43 Numerous studies document extraor-
dinary variabilities in practice. 44 There are also high levels of
40 Blank, supra note 34, at 1581.
41 Id. at 1582.
42 See DAVID MECHANIC, MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY 91-92 (1978).
43 Kerr L. White, Foreword to LYNN PAYER, MEDICINE AND CULTURE 9 (1988).
44 Since the initial paper by John Wennberg & Alan Gittlesohn, Small Area
Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1102 (1973), a large literature has
developed documenting the extraordinary extent of such variation. For a good
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inappropriate use of technologies as evaluated by implicit medical
criteria.45 Confusion exists, however, because of the difficulty of
documenting any substantial relationship between practice variation
and inappropriate applications.
46
Substantial literature documenting enormous geographical
variations in the performance of discretionary procedures suggests
that high rates of utilization are associated with unnecessary and
inappropriate care.4 7 If prevalence is associated with an unneces-
sary or inappropriate pattern of care, constraining the trend by
regulation would be feasible. However, the reality is far more
complex, less well understood, and more imposing from a regulato-
ry perspective. Two RAND studies of utilization of coronary
angiography, carotid endarterectomy, and gastrointestinal tract
endoscopy by Medicare beneficiaries in small area aggregations
found little relationship between the prevalence of these procedures
and their appropriate use as measured by a careful evaluation of
medical records based on carefully formulated criteria.48 There
was, in fact, enormous variation in the use of these procedures.
49
The investigators identified care that they rated as inappropriate,
50
but there was 'no obvious explanation for these differences. 51 It
overview on variation in medical practice, see Special Issue, Variations in Medical
Practice, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 1.
45 There is now an extensive literature on quality and appropriateness of care,
although disagreement persists on methods and criteria for such evaluation. For a
general overview, see Special Issue, The Challenge of Quality, 25 INQUIRY 1 (1988).
The RAND research program exemplifies some of the most outstanding efforts in this
area. RAND researchers report high levels of inappropriate use of hospital
admissions and surgical procedures. For a bibliography of this work, see RAND
CORPoRATIoN, HEALTH RELATED RESEARCH: 1980-91, at 15 (1991). For an excellent
example, see Mark R. Chassin et al., Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographic
Variations in the Use of Health Care Services?: A Study of Three Procedures, 258 JAMA
2533 (1987).
46 See Chassin et al., supra note 45, at 2535-36; Lucian L. Leape et al., Does
Inappropriate Use Explain Small-Area Variations in the Use of Health Care Services?, 263
JAMA 669, 672 (1990) (finding that more inappropriate procedures were found in
areas of high use for three procedures, but that they did not appear to account for
the high use).
47 See Special Issue, supra note 44 (providing sources).
48 See Chassin et al., supra note 45, at 2535; Leape et al., supra note 46, at 669.
49 Use rates for carotid endarterectomy, for example, varied from 5 to 41 per
10,000 Medicare enrollees among the counties surveyed in one study. See Leape et al.,
supra note 46, at 669. These rates, however, were relatively independent of the
definition of appropriateness.
50 Approximately one third of all carotid endarterectomies were so rated. See id.
at 670, tbl. 1.
51 See id. at 672.
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is therefore difficult to understand how we can impose intelligent,
explicit rationing when we cannot clearly isolate the factors that
account for existing practice variation.
The mismatch between the magnitude of variation and defini-
tions of appropriateness reflects practices under conditions of
uncertainty,5 2 which must be accepted until firmer knowledge is
available. The lack of precision in medical care judgments makes
offering directives that cover the entire range of clinical alternatives
a risky proposition. Either more conservative or more radical
treatment alternatives can be advocated; the scientific evidence does
not support a clear choice. 53  Most physicians can agree that
computerized automated tomographic (CAT) scans, nuclear
magnetic resonance (NMR) imaging, and other expensive diagnostic
modalities are used excessively. It may, however, be impossible to
specify all of the contingencies that would distinguish justifiable
from unjustifiable use.
No reasonable way exists of addressing this challenge within the
confines of explicit rationing. Writing detailed specifications will
encumber clinicians in an extensive web of regulations that will
result in many ambiguities, difficulties, and absurdities. Moreover,
a necessarily changing knowledge base requires continuing
modifications-a source of regulatory chaos. 54 Currently prevailing
incentives encourage the use of resources on the margin because
technical procedures are remunerative for the physician and involve
little out-of-pocket expense for the patient.55 Explicit rationing
that limits the capacity for expensive diagnostic and treatment
52 For an excellent analysis of the range of uncertainty, see David M. Eddy,
Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984,
at 75, 75.
53 For some grasp of the types of controversies that define everyday standards of
practice, see, e.g., 2 CONTROVERSY IN INTERNAL MEDICINE (FranzJ. Ingelfinger et al.
eds., 1974) (presenting divergent viewpoints on over 25 common procedures).
54 Hall and Anderson, in discussing this problem, note:
[T]he long lead time involved in redrafting contract forms and submitting
revisions for regulatory approval renders it infeasible to undertake frequent
revisions of highly detailed policy terms to incorporate up-to-the-minute
advances in medical practice and effectiveness information.
Mark Hall & Gerard Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1637, 1684-85 (1992).
55 
See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PAYING THE DOCTOR: SYSTEMS OF REMUNERATION AND
THEIR EFFECTS 139 (1970). Remuneration interacts with patient flow and physician
expectations in complex ways to affect patient care. See David Mechanic, Patient
Behavior and the Organization of Medical Care, in ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE 67, 77-79
(Laurence R. Tancredi ed., 1974).
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modalities through some form of regional scheme could be a
solution. The queue for treatment would then serve to limit
demand by restricting supply.56 Queuing, however, which is based
on a first come, first served principle, does not distinguish between
those patients who have a higher than average probability of
benefiting from the intervention and those who are "lost causes."
Once again, some level of professional judgment is essential to
allocate available resources in relation to need and expected
benefits.
Individual physicians could reasonably exercise such judgment
if constrained by the knowledge that the pool of resources available
for the care of their patients is finite, and that indiscriminate or
careless use would limit valued diagnostic and treatment possibilities
for others. Such implicit rationing is common in most public
institutions throughout our society including schools, social services,
the courts, and almost all other public and nonprofit agencies.
5 7
Not all physicians will be equally responsible, nor will they be
immune from responding to preferred practice styles, patient
demands, or other contingencies extraneous to the clinical decision.
Overall, however, this approach is preferable to the price rationing
and explicit rationing alternatives.
Establishing a global budget and remunerating physicians on
salary, capitation, or fees tied to an established remuneration target
would weaken the current incentives for performing technical
procedures that are unlikely to provide much benefit. Global
budgeting will potentially provide an educational context in which,
on the basis of evidence, physicians will be more open to sugges-
tions to moderate resource utilization because they have less
economic stake in performing procedures. There is also a risk of
underservice, even though physicians are well socialized to be agents
for patients and to balk at organizational pressures that subvert
their sense of clinical responsibility.
58
Making physicians responsible for allocation decisions offers
additional advantages. The clinician is more likely to understand
the complexity of the patient's clinical condition, the social and
56 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
57 See Friedman, supra note 2, at 194 (noting that subjectively certain rights are
absolute, but in reality are subject to the constraint of limited resources).
58 It is difficult for organizational authorities to modify care physicians believe to
be professionally appropriate. See ELIOT FREIDSON, DOCTORING TOGETHER: A STUDY
OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL 86-103 (1975).
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familial consequences of the illness, patient and family preferences
for conservative or aggressive care, and the value placed on possible
future outcomes. Patients vary enormously in their willingness and
ability to withstand pain and discomfort, to tolerate uncertainty, to
fight to overcome illness, and even to stay alive. Although physi-
cians' information on these issues is incomplete and inadequate,
they have far more awareness and sensitivity than bureaucrats who
typically have little or no recent clinical experience and are distant
from the clinical situation. Research in psychology has shown that
as decisionmakers become more distant, they are more likely to
inflict pain.59 The clinical encounter remains a complex psychoso-
cial transaction with powerful opportunities to affect the course of
illness through the expectancies conveyed by the physician and the
patient's development of emotional attachment and dependence.
6 0
Weakening this aspect of the clinical encounter by transforming the
physician's function to limited technical roles would undermine
important elements in the care process.
Although medical care involves numerous routine services,
public concern focuses on situations of uncertainty, in which
patients are seriously ill. The processes of care are sequential and
iterative; both technical medical decisions and patients' personal
assessments depend in part on how the processes of care unfold.6 1
Few other services involve the magnitude of personal priority and
emotional involvement associated with a serious illness. Patients
therefore want a physician whose judgment they trust. As Kenneth
Arrow noted, if patients knew how "to measure the value of
information, [they] would know the information itself. But
information, in the form of skilled care, is precisely what is being
bought from most physicians .... "62 Patients may seek informa-
tion from knowledgeable friends and other patients, medical
literature, or data and advice from consumer groups, but in no way
can they "test the product before consuming it."63 Thus, trust
59 See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 32-43 (1969) (detailing
experiment results that showed an increased ability to inflict pain when the victim is
situated more remotely).60 See JEROME D. FRANK & JULIAN B. FRANK, PERSUASION AND HEALING 132-37
(1991) (noting the strong placebo effect resulting from a patient's emotional
attachment to the physician).
61 See Kassirer, supra note 33.
62 KennethJ. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 946 (1963).
63 Id. at 949.
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plays a key role in seeking the medical care product of any physi-
cian.
B. From Advocacy to Allocation
A major objection to rationing through establishing fixed
budgets is that it shifts the role of physician from advocating the
individual patient's needs to balancing those needs against the need
to use resources responsibly so that the health care needs of the
many may be met.64 The claim is that such conflicting responsibil-
ities dilute the physician's primary responsibility to "do everything
in his power to alleviate [the patient's] needs." 65 Implicit ration-
ing, the critics argue, makes medicine subservient to two masters,
undermining the ethical substructure of the physician-patient
relationship.
66
At a theoretical level this point is unassailable if the physician's
exclusive responsibility to the patient is accepted. In practice,
however, limits have always existed on such advocacy, not the least
of which came from the conflicting economic and social interests of
the physician. The willingness of physicians to provide care and the
intensity of the care provided are influenced by the patient's ability
to pay and by the scope of their insurance coverage. 67 Payment
incentives, particularly fee-for-service payment, increase the
provision of services. 68  George Eliot in her classic novel
Middlemarch noted the incentives to overprescribe among physicians
who compounded their own medications. 69  A contemporary
64 See DAVID MECHANIC, FROM ADVOCACY TO ALLOCATION: THE EVOLVING
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 146-51 (1986).
65 Charles Fried, Equality and Rights in Medical Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.
1976, at 29, 34. Fried's argument is curious in that he emphasizes the importance of
the physician's unlimited advocacy for the patient but also indicates receptivity to
HMOs, a practice context where the physician has dual responsibilities.
66 See e.g., Charles Fried, Rights and Health Care-Beyond Equity and Efficiency, 293
NEw ENG.J. MED. 241, 244 (1975) (noting that rationing forces physicians to serve
the interests of bureaucrats and administrations over those of their patients).67 See KAREN DAVIS ET AL., HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 188-89 (1990).
68 See GLASER, supra note 55, at 139-45.
69 See GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH (Oxford Univ. Press 1961) (1871-72). Eliot
wrote:
One of these reforms was to act stoutly on the strength of a recent legal
decision, and simply prescribe, without dispensing drugs or taking
percentage from druggists. This was an innovation for one who had chosen
to adopt the style of general practitioner in a country town, and would be
felt as offensive criticism by his professional brethren. But Lydgate meant
to innovate in his treatment also, and he was wise enough to see that the
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version of this pattern is found among physicians who maintain or
have equity shares in diagnostic equipment, clinical laboratories, or
specialized treatment facilities to which they refer patients.
70
The realities of practice organization also make the theoretical
ethic of exclusive loyalty to the patient specious. Many physicians
work for companies, insurance programs, multi-specialty group
practices, the government, and other organizations. 71 As a result,
these physicians accommodate competing values, colleague
inclinations, organizational requirements, and the need for
continued institutional viability. In many instances of serious
illness, chronic disease, and long term care, the physician's role
involves the adjudication of both patient and family interests, with
the doctor functioning as a negotiator and conciliator, rather than
as an unfettered agent.
72
best security for his practising honestly according to his belief was to get rid
of systematic temptations to the contrary.
Id. at 154. Additionally, Eliot wrote:
One of the facts quickly rumoured was that Lydgate did not dispense
drugs ....
'It is in that way that hard-working medical men may come to be almost
as mischievous as quacks,' said Lydgate, rather thoughtlessly. 'To get their
own bread they must overdose the king's lieges; and that's a bad sort of
treason, Mr. Mawmsey-undermines the constitution in a fatal way.'
Id. at 473-74.
70 A research literature is developing showing how physicians' economic interests
affect utilization. See BruceJ. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging
in Office Practice-A Comparison of Self-referring and Radiologist-referring Physicians, 323
NEW ENG.J. MED. 1604, 1606 (1990) (finding that physicians who do imaging studies
in their offices as compared to those who refer patients to radiologists for such
services have such examinations done more frequently and usually at higher charges).
71 See Cynthia Wallace, Groups' Advantages Luring More Physicians From Solo
Practices, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Aug. 15, 1986, at 58, 58.
72 This new view is exemplified by a clinical professor of psychiatry at Johns
Hopkins who writes:
I prescribe [an] approach in which the staff, while maintaining legal
responsibility, delegate[s] to appropriate family members the authority for
all treatment decisions. Staff function only as consultants, with no authority
to change family decisions unless there is risk of harm or liability. The
staff's expertise is used in helping the family decide what they and the staff
will do, or do differently, in their family member's treatment.
Michael R. Fox,More Power to the Families, 40 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1109,
1109 (1989). See also Elaine M. Brody, Informal Support Systems in the Rehabilitation of
the Disabled Elderly, in AGING AND REHABILITATION 87, 88 (StanleyJ. Brody & George
E. Ruff eds., 1986) (noting that effective rehabilitation of the disabled elderly requires
"a family focus" on the part of the physicians); Eric J. Pfeiffer & Michelle Mostek,
Services for Families of People with Mental Illness, 42 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
262, 263-64 (1991) (discussing the role of physicians in family support groups for the
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In fact, in the area of chronic mental illness, the National
Alliance for the Mentally Ill has assailed the notion of physician as
exclusive agent as a major impediment to care. It has attacked
professionals who used this ethic to distance families from treat-
ment and rehabilitation processes. 73 Alliance members maintain
that such an orientation puts the patient at risk, increases the
probability of treatment failure, and imposes major costs on family
and community.74 Psychiatrists and other mental health profes-
sionals are learning to incorporate these concerns into patient
management activities, and families are increasingly involved in
treatment planning.
75
The physician's advocacy for the patient is a value of impor-
tance, worthy of vigorous protection, but it is not absolute. Most
physicians are individually responsible for at least several hundred
patients and must apportion their time and efforts in some
reasonable relationship to their competing patients' needs-as well
as to their own needs for leisure. Some, perhaps most, patients
could benefit from more time and solicitude, but the real world
demands that the physician's response be appropriate, not necessari-
relatives of the chronic mentally ill).
7s See Harriet P. Lefley, The Family's Response to Mental Illness in a Relative, in
FAMILIES OF THE MENTALLY ILL: MEETING THE CHALLENGES 3, 9 (New Directions for
Mental Health Services, No. 34, Agnes B. Hatfield ed., 1987) [hereinafter FAMILIES
OF THE MENTALLY ILL] (noting that the mental health provider system fails "to offer
training or involvement in treatment planning to families with a major role in
caregiving").
74 As Lefley describes:
Much has been written about the various stresses imposed on families
by the unresponsiveness and often hostile attitudes of mental health
professionals-a situation that is finally beginning to right itself ....
[I]nconsistent and often contradictory patterns of help and information will
persist throughout the course of the illness. In one type of situation there
is tacit rejection of any communication with the family .... If the family
attempts to learn more, the common patterns of response are deflection of
questions, reluctance to provide diagnosis or illness information on the
grounds of labeling, protestations of confidentiality, and implications that
the family's concern is pathological or self-serving.
Id. at 8-9.
75 See Dale L. Johnson, Professional-Family Collaboration, in FAMILIES OF THE
MENTALLY ILL, supra note 73, at 73, 77; John P. Petrila & Robert L. Sadoff,
Confidentiality and the Family as Caregiver, 43 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 136,
139 (1992) ("Families should not be kept at arm's length because of a notion of
confidentiality ... [exceeding] ... what is necessary to protect the values that it
serves. Mental health professionals may maintain appropriate confidentiality... and
still meet a professional standard of care by communicating necessary and
appropriate information to families . . ").
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ly optimal. In theory, everyone might have the same level of
medical services as the President of the United States, but medical
care is a process better described as "satisficing."76 A stronger
accountability system is possible if we acknowledge and address
realities rather than blindly endorse concepts that even under
simple conditions of practice could be implemented only partially.
In principle, patients should understand the operating assump-
tions of their health program, and this is particularly critical in
multi-choice situations where patients select among varying options.
For many people, HMOs, and related managed care options, will
offer an excellent combination of features and services providing
good value for money, but it is important that they clearly under-
stand the tradeoffs involved. Fundamentally, patients must
understand that, under managed care, the role of the physician as
the patient's agent and advocate may shift in subtle ways to one in
which the physician consciously balances her actions on behalf of
the patient against budgetary considerations.
The idea that one's physician balances interventions against cost
or other considerations makes some patients uncomfortable. In a
recent study of a university employment group, comprised of a
majority of well-educated and sophisticated consumers, almost two-
thirds of those choosing between an HMO and a traditional plan
rated "feeling that your doctor is only concerned about your health
and not about limiting the plan's cost" very important.77 Only two
other considerations were more important: getting an appointment
with your doctor quickly when you want one and feeling your
doctor's concern about your health is his or her primary commit-
ment.78 The vast majority of new HMO enrollees believed that "in
this plan the doctor is only concerned about my health and not
limiting the plan's cost," a perception that was in error.79 Despite
the assumption that enrollees will learn about rationing processes
quickly, the full implications of rationing are not likely to be salient
76 The concept of satisficing, first introduced by Herbert Simon, was intended to
explain the boundaries between rational and non-rational behavior. Simon argued,
contrary to popular conception, that decision-makers could not seek optimal solutions
because of informational and time constraints, but sought an acceptable solution. See
HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 67-70 (1957). In his terms, human
actors "satisfice because they have not the wits to maximize." Id. at xxiv.
77 David Mechanic et al., ChoosingAmong Health Insurance Options: A Study of New
Employees, 27 INQUIRY 14, 17 tbl. 2 (1990).
78 See id.
79 Id. at 18.
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until serious illness strikes and expensive diagnostic approaches,
referrals, inpatient admissions, and rehabilitative technologies are
at issue.
HMOs are commonly marketed with the rhetoric that they keep
people healthy and contain costs by avoiding serious illness.8 0 A
more accurate, but less common, representation is that HMOs offer
a more comprehensive benefit package without additional out-of-
pocket expenditures in exchange for the patient's acceptance of the
primary physician as gate-keeper and some rationing consistent with
the physician's bestjudgment.8 ' HMO physicians continue to view
themselves primarily as their patients' agents and, probably, rarely
compromise their professional judgments regarding appropriateness
of care. On the margin, or in situations of uncertainty, however,
the incentives of implicit rationing tilt care in a different direction
than is typical in fee-for-service practice.
8 2
The HMO and managed care contract should be explicit and
every potential enrollee should know to what degree their gate-
keeper/physician's personal remuneration is contingent upon
staying within utilization targets. Furthermore, patients have a right
to know about any other financial incentives for physicians to limit
expenditures and about their physician's personal economic
holdings in facilities to which they are referred.
8 3
80 See DAVID MECHANIC, THE GROWTH OF BUREAUCRATIC MEDICINE 85-97 (1976).
81 See David Mechanic, Consumer Choice Among Health Insurance Options, HEALTH
AFF., Spring 1989, at 138, 145-48; Mechanic et al., supra note 77, at 21-23.
82 For a review of this literature, see HAROLD S. LUFT, HEALTH MAINTENANCE
ORGANIZATIONs: DIMENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE (1987).
83 The responsiveness of physicians to incentives to constrain costs depends on the
amount of risk, the size of the risk pool, proximity to other members in the risk pool,
and physician culture and philosophy. "In an HMO-wide risk pool, the individual
physician bears an infinitesimal portion of the cost of additional tests or procedures
ordered by that physician .... Economists might not expect this amount of risk to
have a major effect on physician behavior." Alan L. HiUman et al., Contractual
Arrangements Between HMOs and Primary Care Physicians: Three-Tiered HMOs and Risk
Pools, 30 MED. CARE 136, 146 (1992) [hereinafter Contractual Arrangements]. In
contrast, plans that make physician salaries hostage to utilization targets create
undesirable tensions between the physician's self-interest and patient welfare. Such
incentives have been found to be associated with more frequent outpatient visits per
enrollee. See Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians'
Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations?,
321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86, 90 (1989) (noting that HMO incentives prompted
physicians to treat patients in the outpatient setting rather than making costly
referrals).
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C. Explicit Constraints on ProfessionalJudgment
Physicians' professional judgment should be protected, but the
range of their discretion could be constrained considerably by
broader political and regulatory decisions. How much to invest in
medical care and the availability of technology and services are
political, not medical, judgments. Public attitudes suggest that
Americans will not tolerate a tightly rationed health care system that
withholds efficacious, though expensive, technologies. 84 Although
Americans tend to focus on dramatic and highly expensive technolo-
gies as sources of potentially large savings, the use of such technolo-
gies is relatively infrequent. Therefore, fewer opportunities to
contain costs will be realized by limiting infrequent but expensive
procedures than in limiting more common procedures.
Expenditures are a product of the prevalence of interventions
multiplied by unit cost. Much of the cost of medical care is an
aggregation of small and intermediate cost procedures repeated
frequently and among large numbers of patients, such as common
radiology and laboratory procedures. 85 Similarly, surgical proce-
dures of moderate cost, because they are performed commonly,
account for major financial outlays.86 Some of the most common
inpatient diagnostic and surgical procedures for men are CAT scans,
diagnostic ultrasound, cardiac catheterization, prostatectomy,
reduction of fractures, coronary bypass, and repair of inguinal
hernia.8 7 The most frequent female procedures are associated with
84 See, e.g., MECHANIC, supra note 64, at 134 (noting that the public holds "high,
and often unrealistic, expectations of what the physician and new technologies can
achieve"); David Mechanic, Physicians and Patients in Transition, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. 1985, at 9, 9-12 (noting that patients are "sophisticated" about medicine
and support "larger expenditures" for new technology). Surveys of the public
repeatedly find continuing public support for new technology. For example, a survey
of a national sample in 1977 found that more than three-fifths of respondents would
object if"less emphasis would be placed on the use of specialized medical equipment
and techniques" as a cost-saving alternative. The Gallup Org., The Gallup Study of
Public Attitudes Toward Health Care and Health Care Issues-October 1977, in AMERICAN
MEDICAL AWS'N, HEALTH CARE IssuEs: PHYSICIAN AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES 75, 78 tbl.
42 (1978).
85 See Thomas W. Moloney & David E. Rogers, Medical Technology: A Different View
of the Contentious Debate Over Costs, 301 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1413, 1414 (1979).
86 See e.g., Robert S. Stern et al., Diagnostic Accuracy and Appropriateness of Care for
Seborrheic Keratoses: A Pilot Survey of an Approach to Quality Assurance for Cutaneous
Surgery, 265JAMA 74, 74 (1991) (noting that although surgery to remove cutaneous
lesions involve limited costs, the "large volume" of such procedures renders them
appropriate candidates for cost-containment).
87
See NATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
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reproduction, including procedures to assist delivery, Caesarean
sections, repair of obstetrical lacerations, and hysterectomies.
8 8
Rationing discussions often focus on relatively uncommon
procedures such as heart, lung, and liver transplants. At present,
these extraordinary and highly expensive procedures involve
relatively few people because of the difficulty of organ procure-
ment.8 9 Thus, expenditures on these high cost procedures remain
small and are not a serious threat to the overall health budget.
90
Advances in surgery and in the acquisition and preservation of
organs could significantly increase the number of potential
recipients. The experience of the Medicare End Stage Renal
Disease (ESRD) Program suggests that potential growth of such
programs will result from improvements in medical and surgical
techniques and the availability of a financing source.91 This
program which covered 16.6 thousand enrollees at an expenditure
of $184 million in 1974 is estimated to have covered 93.6 thousand
enrollees in 1991 at a cost of $3.7 billion.9 2  As the program
grows, the enrollees covered have become older and sicker and have
more comorbidity and less potential for rehabilitation.
93
The experience of the Medicare ESRD Program has shown that
the availability of an entitlement to a procedure under Medicare
encourages aggressive treatment even though the benefits may be
questionable. The quality of life that can be anticipated in these
critical situations depends on the medical circumstances of the
patients and their motivation to struggle with their condition. Age,
SERVS., PUB. No. (PHS) 91-1232, HEALTH: UNrrED STATES, 1990, at 149 tbl. 77, 151
tbl. 78 (1991); EDMUNDJ. GRAvEs, 1989 SUMMARY: NATIONAL HOSPITAL DIsCHARGE
SURVEY 8 tbl. 8 (National Ctr. for Health Statistics Advance Data No. 199, 1991).
88 See National Ctr. for Health Statistics, supra note 87, at 150 tbl. 77.
89 See Roger W. Evans, The Demand for Transplantation in the United States, in
CLINICAL TRANSPLANTS 1990, at 319, 324-25 (Paul I. Terasaki ed., 1991).
90 See Roger W. Evans, Organ Transplantation Costs, Insurance Coverage and
Reimbursement, in CLINICAL TRANsPLANTS 1990, supra note 89, at 343, 345, 350.
91 See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING SPECIAL REPORT: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL KIDNEY
DIALYSIS AND KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION STUDY 26-27 (1987) (discussing the future
of the ESRD program in the U.S. and the need for technological improvements to
increase efficiency). Patients with ESRD are entitled to dialysis and/or renal
transplantation under an extension of the Medicare program passed by Congress in
1972. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 2991, 86
Stat. 1329, 1463-64 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 426-1 (1988)).
92 See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., supra note 91, at 24 tbls. 2-3. In 1989, the ESRD
program cost about $3 billion. See Saulof Klahr, Rationing of Health Care and the End-
Stage Renal Disease Program, 16 AM.J. KIDNEY DISEASE 392, 392 (1990).93 See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., supra note 91, at 24-25.
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for example, is clearly associated with the extent of comorbidity and
patient condition. Yet, because of the large variance in both
condition and motivation of members of any age group, age alone
cannot serve as a proxy.9 4 Thus, once an entitlement to medical
care becomes available, decisions about treatment must depend on
careful clinical and psychosocialjudgments of patient condition and
motivation.
A core dilemma of such decisionmaking is the difficulty of
distinguishing clinical judgments from normative assessments and
the extent to which these issues become intermingled in an implicit
rationing process. Physicians commonly project their own values
onto their patients in making judgments about patient motivation,
capacity, function, and quality of life. Thomas Halper, for example,
offers numerous examples in which physicians made unwarranted
assumptions of who would or would not benefit from treatment
based on judgments of intelligence, involvement in gainful employ-
ment, and worthiness. 95  Such judgments, however, are not
explicit, but are deeply embedded in the processes of clinical
decisionmaking and are thus not open to discussion or review.
The dilemma faced by physicians in making implicit rationing
decisions is similar to the dilemma underlying the "defensive
medicine" claim in the malpractice area. Physicians commonly
complain of wasteful use of expensive modalities that they deem
necessary to protect themselves against allegations of malprac-
tice.96 Failure to perform these procedures, however, involves a
risk because other informed physicians believe these procedures to
be necessary for competent treatment and will testify accordingly.
The dilemma arises from the uncertainty associated with defining
what constitutes a reasonable quality of care and whether nonper-
formance of particular tests and procedures that rarely yield new
information or positive outcomes is justifiable. In rationing, as in
malpractice assessment, it will be necessary to establish clearer
94 See generally supra notes 30-32.
95 See Thomas Halper, Life and Death in a Welfare State: End-Stage Renal Disease
in the United Kingdom, 63 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 52, 73-78 (1985). Halper
notes that one "major pioneering nephrologist... declared that in selecting patients
for dialysis, preference would be given not only to those with 'the qualities of
reliability, common sense, and stoicism'-all of which arguably would increase the
likelihood of successful treatment-but also patients with young children." Id. at 74
(citation omitted).
9 6 
See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 146-49 (1985).
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norms defining the appropriate thresholds for additional diagnostic
interventions. Everyone agrees that it makes little sense to perform
a CAT scan on every patient with a headache. It is more difficult,
however, to achieve a consensus on appropriate utilization bound-
aries.
The interconnections between social norms and medical
assessments reflect the fact that doctors have social as well as
technical medical functions. We expect them to become involved
in the patient's world and in how the social and psychological
context shapes the course of illness and treatment. Therefore, the
danger is not so much that physicians consciously impose their
values on patients who come from different life circumstances, but
that their normative judgments are so taken for granted that they
are no longer subject to circumspection. Although some inequities
can be reduced by sensitizing and educating doctors about social
and ethical dilemmas, by encouraging peer questioning, and by
making patients more equal partners in decisionmaking, this danger
is the price of professional discretion.
Thus, initially, the threshold decision of whether to provide a
new entitlement is clearly an issue with political implications and
consequences. However, once the entitlement is available, the most
constructive way of controlling the cost of the entitlement is to
constrain supply and allow expert professionals to allocate treat-
ment. This is not to say implicit rationing does not have some
serious difficulties. Allocation of services through clinical judgment
of patient condition and motivation requires built-in safeguards for
resolving contested cases, but as a medical care rationing approach
it offers the most realistic model for dealing with the complexities
and uncertainties of clinical situations.
97
97 In this Symposium, Hall and Anderson argue that the best alternative for
resolving disputes concerning coverage is to "specify a decisional process as an
alternative to litigation." Hall & Anderson, supra note 54, at 1683. They also offer
a detailed model of how such an approach might be applied. Hall and Anderson's
suggestions for insurance contract revisions are fully consistent with the regulated
implicit rationing model advocated in this paper. However, the dispute resolution
process they advocate does not address the question of who initially makes the
determination of whether a patient is eligible for a particular procedure. I argue that
such decisions are better made by clinicians than plan administrators or regulators.
Once such decisions are made by clinicians, the mechanisms suggested by Hall and
Anderson could be used to adjudicate disputes between patients and physicians.
1992] 1737
1738 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1713
D. What Can We Learn From International Comparisons?
The most widely discussed and influential study of rationing, by
Henry Aaron and William Schwartz, compared how England and the
United States managed a range of technologies and treatments.
98
Large differences in the uses of various treatments and technologies
were reported, but the extent of rationing depended on the area of
concern. Treatment for hemophilia, radiation therapy, and
chemotherapy for cancer were used with comparable frequency in
the two countries. 99 Similarly, the frequency of hip replacement
did not vary much, although the waiting period was longer in Eng-
land.1 0 0 In contrast, coronary artery surgery was ten times more
frequent in the United States, and dialysis and uncertain cancer
treatments were less frequently utilized in England. 0 1
Interpreting these results requires some understanding of
context of health care provision in each country. Aaron and
Schwartz selected England, a Western nation with highly con-
strained investment in its health sector.10 2  At the time of the
study, hospital expenditures per capita were less than half of those
in the United States, largely as a result of a relatively low investment
98 See HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION:
RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE (1984). The Aaron and Schwartz study included kidney
dialysis and transplantation, treatment for hemophilia, cancer chemotherapy,
radiotherapy treatment for cancer, bone marrow transplantation, total parenteral
nutrition, hip replacement, coronary artery surgery, CAT scans, and diagnostic x-rays.
9 See id. at 37-50 (noting that differences in the frequency of hemophilia
treatments in the two countries are due to differing medical approaches rather than
resource limitations, that the demand for radiotherapy is being met in both countries,
and that both approach certain cancers-treatable metastatic tumors and prostatic and
breast carcinoma-with about the same frequency).
100 See id. at 59 (noting that "the British do about three-quarters to four-fifths as
many total hip replacements and nearly as much hip surgery of all kinds as
Americans," and analyzing the reasons for long waiting lists).
101 See id. at 64, 32-33, 48 (stating that while "U.S. surgeons did about 490
coronary artery bypass operations per million population in 1979, British surgeons
did about 55 per million in 1977," that "virtually every patient suffering from chronic
kidney failure is treated in the United States, whereas most in Britain are not," and
that "[o]ncologists with experience in both countries estimate that, in general, the rate
of treatment of solid tumors in Britain is only one-fifth or one-sixth as high as in the
United States").
102 In 1989, England invested 5.8% of its gross domestic product on health
expenditures, in contrast to 11.8% in the United States and 8.7% in Canada. See
George J. Scheiber et al., Health Care Systems in Twenty-four Countries, HEALTH AFF.,
Fall 1991, at 22, 24 exhibit 1. Among 24 member countries in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), only Greece (5.1%) and Turkey
(3.9%) had a lower level of health care investment. Id.
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in technology. 1 3  However, by selecting relatively expensive
technological approaches-several of dubious value in reducing
mortality or improving the quality of life-the study offers only a
partial comparison. For example, England guarantees everyone
access to a general practitioner, while millions in the United States
face significant access barriers to primary medical care services.
10 4
The United States, on the other hand, aggressively uses expensive
technologies, which are more prevalent because of the incentives in
fee-for-service and procedure-based reimbursement.10 5 Moreover,
within Britain's health care budget, significant priority is given to
the social care of the mentally ill and frail elderly persons, areas in
which the U.S. health care system has major deficiencies. 10 6  In
contrast, the U.S. severely rations the availability of public services
for persons with psychiatric disabilities, substance abusers, and
other populations with extensive disabilities. 10 7 Had Aaron and
Schwartz chosen a different sample of health services, a somewhat
different picture of the rationing processes might have been
conveyed.
103 See AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 6 (stating that "per capital hospital
expenditures are now less than half as large as those in the United States, even after
adjustment for salary differences").
104 See THE PEPPER COMM'N, A CALL FOR ACTION 21-25 (1990) (Final Report of
U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care) (noting the persuasive
problems with uninsured and underinsured segments of the U.S. population).
105 See GLASER, supra note 55, at 139-45.
106 See DAVID MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 14 (3d ed. 1989)
(noting that the seriously mentally ill are underinsured and underserved); THE PEPPER
COMM'N, supra note 104, at 21-25. As an editorial in the British MedicalJournal noted:
It is a mistake to concentrate exclusively on a number of procedures ... for
this risks giving a distorted picture of the health care system as a whole.
Rationing not only concerns decisions about what resources to devote to
individual patients; it also entails decisions about how to ration resources
between different groups of patients. The NHS forces explicit choices about
the relative priority to be given to the acutely ill, the mentally ill, the old,
and the young. Unfortunately, Aaron and Schwartz ignore this dimension,
with the result that they present what is at best an incomplete balance sheet.
Rudolph Klein, Rationing Health Care, 289 BRITISH MED.J. 143, 144 (1984).
107 See MECHANIC, supra note 106, at 143-44; see also E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHERE
TO Go: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 5-6 (1988) (discussing
the tragic effects of deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill); David Mechanic & Linda
Aiken, Improving the Care of Patients with Chronic Mental Illness, 25 NEW ENG.J. MED.
1634, 1635 (1987) (noting the serious deficiencies in community care for the
chronically mentally ill).
Even patients who have private insurance coverage typically have limited benefits
that require extensive cost-sharing. See Jo Brady et al., Trends in Private Insurance
Coverage for Mental Illness, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1276, 1278 (1986).
17391992]
1740 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1713
Nevertheless, Aaron and Schwartz provide a valuable analysis of
the influences that result in different degrees of rationing. These
influences include the age of the patient, the nature of the disease,
the visibility of the disease, public advocacy, aggregate cost
implications, need for capital outlays, and costs of alternatives to
active care.10 8 They observe that the British disproportionately
invest their health funds in children-119% of expenditures per
adult, as compared with the United States' 37%.'o9 Analysts in
the United States have been critical of the relatively low investment
in the health care of children, attributing the situation in part to the
comparative disadvantage of advocates for children relative to the
elderly in making claims within our political process. 10 The high
rates of voter participation and political organization among the
elderly constitute a powerful political force and the U.S. health care
system is thus heavily weighted in the direction of elderly care. In
contrast, the British government has limited the capacity to provide
dialysis to ESRD patients based on a clear relationship between age
and restricted access.11 Although the British have no formal
cutoff period by age, Aaron and Schwartz found, during the period
of their study, that patients over age fifty-five were rarely seen as
candidates for dialysis.
11 2
1. Rationing by Age
The reluctance of British general practitioners and medical
specialists to refer older patients because of limited treatment
capacity resulted in an implicit age criterion in health care ration-
ing. The extent of knowledge of the current state of treatment,
links to specialists in nephrology units, and judgments on who could
benefit from treatment and how much treatment patients would
108 See AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 97-99 (outlining the factors that
affect rationing).
109 See id. at 97.
110 See Samuel H. Preston, Children and the Elderly: Divergent Paths for America's
Dependents, 21 DEMOGRAPHY 435,445-48 (1984) (arguing that the elderly have gained
power relative to children in all areas that determine political influence).
... See AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 97 (noting "[t]he low incidence of
chronic dialysis among the elderly with renal failure" as an example of rationing
based on age).
112 See id. at 34 (stating that in Britain for patients with kidney failure between
ages fifty-five through sixty-four, the rate of treatment is about one-third, and for
patients over sixty-five, less than one-tenth, that of patients in France, West Germany,
and Italy).
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receive varied among these non-nephrologists. Patients motivated
to receive treatment, regardless of age, who were sufficiently
aggressive, and who received the support of a referring physician,
might receive treatment given the informality of the referral
process.113 Referring doctors, aware of resource realities, were
less likely to try to achieve referral of more frail patients, thus
informally helping to adjust demand to capacity.114 Aaron and
Schwartz reported considerable discomfort among general practitio-
ners who were advising elderly patients with ESRD that little could
be done.
115
The conclusions reported by Aaron and Schwartz on age
rationing have commonly been exaggerated. In comparing Britain
with Italy, West Germany, France, and the United States, they
reported that as age increased, the disparity in rates of dialysis
between Britain and these other nations increased.116  Data
reported on renal replacement therapy in Newcastle upon Tyne,
however, for the period of 1974 to 1985, suggests a growing
proportion of unit patients over age sixty due in part to changing
technology and attitudes. 117 In the mid-1970s, only 2.2% to 7%
of patients initiating treatment were over age sixty; by 1985, such
patients starting treatment constituted more than one-third of all
patients on dialysis.
118
Non-nephrologist discretion within the British implicit rationing
approach serves a variety of functions. It allows a general practitio-
ner or medical specialist to take into account not only chronological
age, but also the health status and robustness of the individual and
the potential benefits that dialysis might offer under varying
circumstances. It also allows for some flexibility in responding to
"3 See id. at 107-08 (noting the options of second opinions, use of hospital
emergency rooms, seeking out the specialist directly, and exploiting geographical
differences in health care resources).
114 See id. at 104 (noting for example, the infrequency of the elderly's referrals for
kidney dialysis and that "[b]y not referring the patient, the doctor spares the
nephrologist from having to say no and the patient and family a painful rejection").
115 See id. (reporting that refusing kidney dialysis treatment is always difficult, but
becomes easier if the doctor can convince "himself that the patient is unsuitable
because he is 'a bit crumbly'").
116 See supra note 112.
117 SeeJ.S. Tapson et al., Renal Replacement Therapy in Patients Aged Over 60 Years,
63 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 1071, 1076 (1987) (noting that the introduction of
continuous ambulatory peritoneal dialysis (CAPD) in 1978 was primarily responsible
for this growing acceptance of the elderly into dialysis and reporting that survey
results indicate that patients enjoy life on dialysis more than is commonly thought).
118 See id. at 1072 fig. 1.
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patient and family motivation and persistence in seeking treatment
and tensions that develop in the clinical situation.
Alternatively, the British could have used an explicit rationing
approach by establishing formal criteria, which strictly rationed by
age. While such a measure might have provided an illusion of
equity with respect to age, it would have been difficult to adminis-
ter. Moreover, the British public would have found such a clear
formal mandate conceptually unacceptable.11 9 It is one matter to
consider age tempered by thoughtful clinical judgment; it is quite
another to impose an inflexible blanket age rule.
Daniel Callahan has suggested that we place limits "on the
length of individual lives that a society can sensibly be expected to
maintain ... ."120 He urges us to desist from pursuing goals that
primarily benefit the elderly because they will result in increasing
disparity between our aspirations and our ability to meet them.
12 1
His contention that the elderly should die gracefully, without undue
demand on the "medical commons," is flawed by its dependence on
chronological age as an explicit criterion. 122 People age in vary-
ing ways, and members of any given age group are heterogeneous
with respect to physical health status, psychological well-being, and
ability to carry out daily living tasks. Thus, even though chronologi-
cal age is a convenient administrative marker and formal age rules
have the appearance of equity, large inequities become evident
when circumstances other than chronological age are consid-
ered.
l2 3
Many elderly persons have extraordinary capacities, extensive
and intimate social ties, and a great zest for living. Unfortunately,
attempts to define these capacities as criteria explicitly in any
reasonable way is extremely difficult and likely to frustrate even the
most expert administrative authority. Therefore, even though the
use of medical criteria for assessing the value of an uncertain
119 Some years ago, the medical director of an NHS hospital posted a directive
that patients over 65 years of age were not to be resuscitated. Michael B. Stevens,
Withholding Resuscitation, 33 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN, Jan. 1986, at 207 (1986). This
resulted in a major public uproar and the immediate recision of the directive. Id.
120 See Daniel Callahan, Adequate Health Care and an Aging Society: Are They Morally
Compatible?, DAEDALUS, Winter 1986, at 247, 266.
12' See id. at 248-49.
122 See David Mechanic, Health Care and the Elderly, 503 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 89, 94-95 (1989) (critiquing Callahan's focus on age as a criterion for
medical care).
123 See Paul E. Kalb, Defining an "Adequate" Package of Health Care Benefits, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1987, 1995-97 (1992) (discussing limiting principles to adequate care).
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intervention may result in fewer interventions for the elderly, the
criteria should remain the physician-determined effectiveness of the
intervention and its likely benefits on a case-by-case basis.
2. Explaining American-British Differences
Aaron and Schwartz offer a variety of plausible hypotheses to
explain why American and British practices diverge more in some
areas than others, but some of these post hoc explanations are not
persuasive. For example, they suggest that the similarity in cancer
therapy between the two countries reflects the fear that cancer
inspires in the public.1 24 Similarly, they argue that public re-
sponses to the visibility of suffering accounts for comparable
responses for hemophilia relative to the large differences in the use
of coronary bypass surgery.
125
There are numerous examples suggesting that fear of illness and
visibility of suffering are inadequate or incomplete explanations for
the differences in treatment approaches between the two nations.
Such diseases as schizophrenia and Alzheimer's disease are fearsome
and highly visible, yet they have not resulted in comparable British
and American efforts to ensure the essential services needed. The
British tend to be utilitarian in orientation while Americans tend to
be aggressively interventionist. 126 The British have given a higher
priority to non-interventionist care for the fragile elderly and the
chronic mentally ill than has the American health care system.
1 27
This prioritizing reflects a greater concern in British society for the
caring dimensions of health interventions. The relatively low rate
of coronary bypass surgery, CAT scans, and uncertain cancer
interventions in England substantially reflects resource constraints,
but also reflects skepticism of the true need and value of these
124 See AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 97 (terming cancer a dread disease
and positing that fear of cancer results in its receiving a disproportionate allocation
of medical resources).
125 See id. at 98 (reasoning that "[p]eople do not like visible misery" and "are made
uncomfortable if they must watch severe and untreated suffering").
126 See LYNN PAYER, MEDICINE AND CULTURE 125 (1988) (stating that American
doctors do more diagnostic testing, perform more surgery, and prescribe higher doses
of medication than their British counterparts).
127 See George Godber, Forty Years of the NHS, 297 BRITISH MED. J. 37, 41-42
(1988) (discussing the development of geriatrics and psychiatry in the British system
over the past forty years); William L. Kissick, The British National Health Service: Foi4
Not Prototype, 9 TRANSACTIONS & STUD. C. PHYSICIANS PHILA. 91, 99 (1987) (listing
severely physically and mentally handicapped children and physically handicapped
elderly among the seven priority groups identified in a 1970 NHS study).
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interventions. In addition, the British response reflects widespread
belief that these procedures are overutilized in the American
context, often because of economic incentives.
128
One utilitarian approach to rationing is to extend care more
widely, but to narrow the range of available services to those
services believed to be most important or effective. In 1989,
Oregon passed legislation extending Medicaid to a larger population
while providing a new and more restrictive selection of benefits to
a subset of Medicaid recipients. The Oregon plan divided medical
services into 709 categories, but anticipated that only the first 588
would be reimbursed. Earlier drafts of this priority list were greatly
criticized, partly for violating the "rule of rescue." 129 The initial
list of conditions rated minor treatments more highly than some
life-saving measures, ostensibly reflecting cost-effectiveness
considerations. For example, tooth capping was given a slightly
higher priority rating than surgery for ectopic pregnancy or
appendectomy, procedures that could be life-saving.
130
Commenting on Oregon's utilitarian approach, David Hadorn
notes that "there is a fact about the human psyche that will
inevitably trump the utilitarian rationality that is implicit in cost-
effectiveness analysis: people cannot stand idly by when an identi-
fied person's life is visibly threatened if effective rescue measures
are available." 131  Hadorn makes an important point but over-
states it. It is unlikely the public will accept an explicit directive
that withholds a life-saving procedure, preferring instead compara-
ble decisions to withhold services case-by-case in clinical transac-
tions. 132  The British system of rationing functions with little
conflict because it incorporates normative judgments as part of the
128 See AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 48-49 (noting that fee-for-service
payment creates incentives for U.S. surgeons to perform coronary bypass surgery and
for U.S. doctors to treat incurable metastatic cancer, and that many health economists
and planners think that the U.S. has overinvested in CAT scanners and that
unnecessary x-rays are often performed).
129 See David C. Hadorn, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-effectiveness
Meets the Rule of Rescue, 265 JAMA 2218, 2219 (1991) (describing the powerful
influence of the rule of rescue, which refers to people's perceived duty to save
endangered life whenever possible).
130 See id.
131 Id.
132 See supra note 119.
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process of clinical decisionmaking13 3 The public seems better
prepared to allow such decisions to evolve in relationships between
patients and their physicians.
The "rule of rescue" and the fact that such rescues involve
modest aggregate costs is a more credible explanation for the full
treatment of hemophilia in England than the one provided by
Aaron and Schwartz. As of 1984, there were fewer than 100 new
cases of hemophilia diagnosed each year in Britain, and the costs of
treatment were reported to be in the $10,000-20,000 range.1 3 4 In
contrast, the number of patients and potential aggregate costs
involved in dialysis are substantially greater." 5 As the extent of
rationing of dialysis by age became more widely known-probably in
part due to the publicity generated by the Aaron and Schwartz
book-the British government responded by expanding dialysis
capacity. The number of patients treated for ESRD in Britain
increased from 153 to 242 per million population between 1983 and
1986.136 This response indicates that the ability of the British
bureaucracy to maintain constraints depends substantially on the
insulation of its decisions from the political process.
The American public would not accept the constraints typical of
the British system, nor can we insulate budgeting decisions from the
political process as successfully as the English. Interest group
pressure is likely to play a more significant role in the United States.
The politics of priority setting and investments in research,
technologies, and services are routinely influenced by advocacy
organizations. For example, aggressive advocates have gained
coverage of ESRD by Medicare, illustrating a form of selective
coverage widely viewed as a poor example of how to devise health
policy.'3 7 A recent effort to discontinue the National Institutes
133 See Halper, supra note 95, at 79 (noting that in the clinical setting, patients will
be agreeable to physician decisions because they view them as medical rather than
political).
154 See AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 98 (noting that low numbers exempt
this group from rationing).
1'5 See id. at 32-33 (noting that 69 people per million were in dialysis and 56 per
million had transplants in 1980, and that the "cost of hemodialysis in Britain in 1977
averaged $18,000 in hospitals and $11,500 at home").
1S6ee HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv., Dec. 1989, at 174 tbl. 47 (Supp.) (tabulating
the number of patients treated for end stage renal failure by country from 1970 to
1987).
137 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, DISEASE BY DISEASE: TOWARD NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE?-REPORT OF A PANEL: IMPLICATIONS OF A CATEGORICAL CATASTROPHIC
DISEASE APPROACH TO NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 7 (1973) (objecting to a disease-
by-disease approach primarily because of equity concerns and the fear that as more
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of Health research program on the artificial heart was rejected by
Congress in response to vigorous and influential advocates.
138
American health care is meticulously scrutinized by a wide range of
interest groups and the mass media. For example, the close scrutiny
of developments in AIDS research by advocacy groups allows them
to influence how the condition is defined, the manner of carrying
out and regulating clinical trials, the availability and pricing of
drugs, and other relevant public health policies.1 39 Similarly, the
media is likely to remain vigilant, keeping close check on emerging
knowledge and technology as well as on the rapidity of their
application. Thus, as the American system moves toward more
serious rationing, it is likely to do so under the intense scrutiny of
an interested and informed public.
III. MAKING IMPLICIT RATIONING SYSTEMS ACCOUNTABLE
Implicit rationing is often insulated from public view and is thus
susceptible to abuse. One advantage of explicit decisions is that
they are visible and can be debated in the media and other forums.
The public nature of explicit rationing, however, is easily exaggerat-
ed; many administrative decisions are highly technical and do not
attract public attention. Powerful interest groups with high levels
of technical expertise commonly negotiate compromises outside the
view of other interested parties with less expertise and access to the
political process. 140 Many factors contribute to disparities in
access including the existing distribution of health facilities, the
varying capacities of institutions to apply new technologies and to
attract new programs and grants, the preferences and vocational
decisions of health professionals, and the politics of the budgeting
diseases are covered, medical resources would be skewed in the direction of expensive
technologies).
138 SeeJanny Scott, Lobbying Blitz Seen Behind Restoring of FundsforArtificial Heart
Research, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1988, § 1, at 3 (reporting that the National Heart, Lung,
and Blood Institute restored funds for the program upon threat of Senate retaliation
via specific limits on how federal research money can be spent).
See William B. Rubenstein, Law and Empowerment: The Idea of Order in the Time
of AIDS, 98 YALE L.J. 975, 990-94 (1989) (book review); see also Jane Gross, Turning
Disease into Political Cause: First AIDS, and Now Breast Cancer, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 7, 1991,
at A12 (discussing advocacy by women with breast cancer).
140 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS & COLIN S. DIVER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 359-63 (1987) (discussing how special interest groups influenced the
standards set by the EPA for coal emissions). Inevitably, administrative decisions are
politicized and this often results in geographic variations in resource allocation and
differential access. See id.
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process itself.1 41  In sum, there is little evidence to support the
idealized notion that an explicit budget process inevitably levels the
playing field.
A. Achieving Accountability
An accountable implicit rationing system must meet three initial
conditions to some extent. First, mechanisms must be in place to
restrain variabilities in practice that cannot be justified by differenc-
es in the morbidity of patient populations or by clinical uncertainty.
As noted throughout, while the boundaries of treatment will have
to remain flexible because much remains to be learned about what
is truly good practice, 142 physician groups must, at the very least,
regulate peers who transcend any reasonable or professionally
justifiable basis for unusual practices. Second, physicians must
agree to and support remunerative arrangements that use incentives
to encourage balanced and effective care. 143  Third, physician
groups must be vigilant to ensure that services are allocated fairly,
based on need and not in response to the most sophisticated,
aggressive, and demanding patients. Increased sensitivity to this
issue and clear norms reinforced by physician peer groups and
outside review can reduce differential treatment according to
141 Despite its focus on equity issues for several decades, the NHS continues to
have disparities in the distribution of facilities and practitioners, access to hospitals
and other types of care, and health outcomes by socioeconomic status. See DOUGLAS
BLACK ET AL., INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH: THE BLACK REPORT 51-64 (1982).
142 As Hall and Anderson properly note:
[W]hile it may be possible to identify clearly unwarranted procedures or
specific applications of useful procedures where care is unwarranted in
specific circumstances, no listing can possibly be detailed enough to cover
all of the permutations that could possibly occur. Health status and patient
preferences are simply too varied to practice medicine entirely by cookbook
or computer.
Hall & Anderson, supra note 54, at 1685 (footnote omitted). "[M]edicine is much too
complex for anyone to specify a complete 'cookbook.' Although explicit rules for
delivering health care may be useful, at some point physicians must be given
discretion .... " Contractual Arrangements, supra note 83, at 148.
143 The cooperation of the American Medical Association and other medical
groups in the development of a resource-based relative-value approach to physician
payment reflects the possibilities forjoint activities among organizations with varying
interests. However, continued collaboration wasjeopardized as a result of implemen-
tation decisions by the Health Care Financing Administration which would have
resulted in large reductions in physician remuneration. For an analysis of the issues,
see Philip R. Lee & Paul B. Ginsburg, The Trials of Medicare Physician Payment Reform,
266JAMA 1562 (1991).
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socioeconomic status, race, gender, or other personal characteris-
tics.
1. Deterrents to Withholding Beneficial Services
On the margins economic incentives work, 14 although the
professionalism of most physicians moderate their influence.
Regardless of professionalism claims, however, implicit rationing is
partly acceptable because most physicians-by training and inclina-
tion-are highly professional, resist inappropriate organizational
pressures, and practice at a high ethical level. 145 Personal remu-
neration arrangements that improperly modify medical decision-
making by providing economic incentives to doctors to withhold
services should be prohibited. 146 Comparable concerns apply to
fee-for-service practitioners whose decisions to do more in marginal
situations are affected by payment incentives. Patients are in a
somewhat better position to refuse unwanted services or ask for
second opinions in fee-for-service settings. In contrast, most
patients may not even be aware of treatment possibilities when
services are withheld. Therefore, deterrents to withholding services
require closer scrutiny and regulation.
Although the tort system has many deficiencies, the threat of
malpractice may also help deter denial of obvious beneficial
services. 147 Americans typically expect aggressive intervention,
and denial of an essential service is grist for the malpractice mill.
Furthermore, because standards in the United States are high,
courts and juries are unlikely to be sympathetic to the denial of
144 SeeJohn M. Eisenberg, Economics, 265JAMA 3113,3114-15 (1991) (summariz-
ing recent research and concluding that "there is some response by physicians to
financial incentives, but the precise pattern of these responses has not yet been clearly
elucidated").
145 See Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a
Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1748 (1987) (noting that the
"physician's natural inclination is to act on behalf of the patient, and they react to
other stimuli than the purely economic").
146 See id. at 1747-48. For instance, a 1987 survey reported that 23% of for-profit
plans put primary care physicians at individual personal risk for exceeding targets.
See id. at 1746. Concern about inappropriate withholding of services led Congress
in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) "to prohibit HMOs from making
incentive payments to physicians that might reduce the use of health care services
.... Ensuing debate about the meaning and the feasibility of regulating 'bad'
incentives led to postponement of the implementation of this law...." Contractual
Arrangements, supra note 83, at 136.
141See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal
Issues, 59 TEXAs L. REV. 1401, 1417 (1981).
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services known to be efficacious. 148 Alternative mechanisms can
also be developed to allow disaffected patients to appeal the refusal
of a service they believe to be necessary. Such mechanisms would
contribute to reducing doctor/patient tensions and would provide
a window for monitoring decisionmaking at the margins.
149
All systems of implicit rationing, such as HMOs, should have
highly visible, accessible, and easily usable grievance mechanisms
that facilitate the review of denials of service that patients believe
they should receive. These mechanisms might be structured as a
hierarchy of procedures ranging from the highly informal to more
formal adjudication. The process might begin with an ombudsper-
son who negotiates disagreements between patients and their
providers, with unresolved issues reviewed by an institutional
committee representing the plan, clinicians, and patients. Such
procedures could serve as a buffer against litigation that is slow and
costly for all involved, and does not typically result in an equitable
resolution of conflicts.
A major protection against underservice is careful review and
periodic audits in problematic areas of care. As physicians become
more aware of sharing a "medical commons," they will have a
greater stake in ensuring that resources are used wisely and
effectively. To the extent that physicians must consciously function
within such constraints, they will be more thoughtful about
aggressive care when the value of intervention is uncertain.
Physicians prefer action, but functioning under implicit constraints
can temper these inclinations, particularly if the action is of little or
no value. One risk is that physicians as a group may adopt highly
conservative norms that restrain colleagues whose best judgment
leads to more interventionist practices. At present, however,
American medical care is aggressively interventionist and the
dangers of restraint are more theoretical than real.
148 Hall and Anderson note: "[N]o matter how much discretion a contract gives
the insurer, courts will never dispense with a level of review entailing at least a
showing of minimum rationality and substantial evidence, concepts that are well
articulated in administrative law and constitutional due processjurisprudence." Hall
& Anderson, supra note 54, at 1673 (footnote omitted).
149 Alternatively, Hall and Anderson suggest the possibility of arbitration for
dispute resolution. They note that "[d]emocratic dispute resolution is particularly
attractive because this mitigates the conflict of interest of the insurer or self-insured
employer at the same time that it preserves the group perspective of a pool of insured
subscribers." Id. at 1696.
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2. Deterrents to Providing Unwanted Services
The attraction of American doctors to technology, even when
there are no benefits, requires intense scrutiny. Electronic fetal
heart rate monitoring (EFM) was introduced in 1969 and was widely
adopted, replacing the traditional method of auscultation in most
obstetrical units.150  Many randomized controlled trials showed
this technology to have no value beyond traditional methods and to
have some possible disadvantages in that it occasionally leads to
exaggerated assessments of fetal distress. 151 One consequence is
an increased number of Caesarean sections and forceps deliver-
ies. 152 Defenders of the technology believed its value would be
more evident in the case of premature infants, but a randomized
controlled trial ,id not confirm this. 153 Instead, low birth weight
infants who had EFM had increased risk of cerebral palsy as
compared to those assessed by the traditional method.
154
A similar situation occurs in providing highly technological
efforts to delay the end of life. This technology incurs substantial
costs when many patients and their families would prefer a less
dramatic and less prolonged death. There is increasing public
interest in living wills, medical powers of attorney, and related
concepts, and studies suggest that a majority of persons believe they
would not choose life-sustaining treatment if they had a poor
prognosis. 155  Physicians remain resistant to discussing "do-not-
150 See Kirkwood K. Shy et al., Evaluating a New Technology: The Effectiveness of
Electronic Fetal Heart Rate Monitoring, 8 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 165, 182 (1987).
151 See id. at 187 (stating that EFM is "vulnerable to abandonment in the future
since its beneficial effects on patient outcomes are not well documented").
152 See Randall S. Stafford, Alternative Strategies for Controlling Rising Caesarean
Section Rates, 263JAMA 683,684 fig. 1 (1990) (reporting thatbetween 1970 and 1987,
the rate of all deliveries by Caesarian section increased from 5.5% to 24.4%.). One
might speculate how the introduction of technology might interfere with the
provision of emotional support during labor. See John Kennell et al., Continuous
Emotional Support During Labor in a U.S. Hospital: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 265
JAMA 2197, 2201 (1991) (reporting that such support decreases obstetric interven-
tions including Caesarean sections and forceps deliveries and the need for epidural
anesthetic, and is associated with shorter duration of labor and a lower rate of
maternal fever).
153 See Kirkwood K. Shy et al., Effects of Electronic Fetal-Heart-Rate Monitoring, as
Compared with Periodic Auscultation, on the Neurologic Development of Premature Infants,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 588, 593 (1990) (finding that EFM "did not improve the
neurologic development of children born prematurely").
154 See id. at 592 (suggesting that this might be related to the early age at which
the diagnoses were made).
155 See, e.g., Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care-A Case for
Greater Use, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED 889, 891 (1991) (surveying patients' attitudes
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resuscitate" orders and related concerns with their patients, a type
of interaction which they find uncomfortable. 156 Similarly, many
patients prefer less aggressive treatment alternatives than many
physicians are inclined to provide. When patients are actually given
options, many choose more limited approaches than physicians
would have anticipated.157 There is ample opportunity to involve
patients to a much larger degree in choices about their own
treatment. The growing interest in assisted death reflects increasing
public unease with the perils of medicine's technological imperative.
One example of a highly expensive modality is intensive care,
which costs approximately four times more per day than an ordinary
hospital stay. 158 If every seriously ill patient received intensive
care, the aggregate costs would be extremely high. It makes little
sense to use this expensive modality for patients whose prognosis is
clearly hopeless or for those with little expected future quality of
life. Nor is it justifiable for patients who are likely to do equally
well with less intensive and expensive care.
159
Intelligent treatment and referral decisions depend on solid
knowledge of what works and what is cost-effective. Our current
knowledge is too uncertain to set specific criteria for admission and
towards medical intervention in four progressively worse scenarios and finding that
an average of 71% of patients would refuse medical intervention).156 See Susanna E. Bedell & Thomas L. Delbanco, Choices About Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation in the Hospital: When Do Physicians Talk With Patients?, 310 NEW ENG.J.
MED. 1089, 1091 (1984) (noting that many physicians feel that it is the job of the
doctor to make resuscitation decisions).157 See John E. Wennberg, Outcomes Research, Cost Containmen and the Fear of
Health Care Rationing, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1203 (1990) (commenting that
patients are more "averse to risks" than physicians).
158 See Paul E. Kalb & David H. Miller, Utilization StrategiesforIntensive Care Units,
261JAMA 2389,2391 (1989) (reporting that estimated ratios range from 3.5:1 to 5:1).
159 There are clinical costs as well as benefits in intensive care. For example, for
some patients the risks of iatrogenesis may substantially outweigh the possible
benefits of more intensive monitoring. As Max Weil notes about intensive care, it is
not without risk. In discussing the use of the Swan-Ganz catheter, he notes:
It provides us with some very helpful information not otherwise available.
But in 2-3 percent of all cases, ... [it] produces a pulmonary infarct-death
of lung tissue which, under conditions of other critical illness, may of itself
curtail the patient's chance of survival.
Such catheters, if kept in place for six days, not only begin to lose their
utility but to [sic] cause a variety of complications, such as infections and
blood clots. And the cost of keeping the catheters in place for six days is
estimated to be 2 percent of the patient's life ....
Max H. Weil, Alternatives to Rationing, in RATIONING MEDICAL CARE FOR THE
CRITICALLY ILL 17, 18 (Martin A. Strosberg et al. eds., 1989).
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discharge, but research on outcomes may inform decisions about
the value of alternative interventions. Even the most sophisticated
clinical trials, however, are limited to select groups of patients who
meet study criteria and may not represent the populations that
physicians may typically see. Thus, even when rigorous research
results are available, determining their applicability to patients with
different social and clinical characteristics involves extrapolation.
Over time, models, based on refined medical criteria, are likely to
develop. 160 Because of variation in the circumstances of patients,
these models cannot be mechanically applied, but they can provide
guidance for physicians to consider as they struggle with clinical
decisions under uncertainty.
B. Tragic Choices
The allocation of scarce resources, as in the case of organ
transplantation, is not prototypical of the majority of rationing
decisions made within our vast health care system. Decisions about
the allocation of scarce life-saving resources, however, will become
more common with technological advances and will receive a great
deal of publicity. These decisions detract attention from the far
more numerous circumstances under which more routine types of
rationing occur.
The problem with the dramatic case of who gets the heart and
lung transplant among equally medically eligible recipients is that
there is no answer, and resolution requires an arbitrary decision
among competing values. To the extent that predictive medical
models can be improved it may be possible to make finer biological
gradations in ranking those most likely to benefit. The discrimina-
tions, however, may become so small as to have little practical
import. Maintaining the illusion that only medical criteria are
operative makes it possible to avoid agonizing choices among
competing values.
An alternative, of course, in deciding among equally medically
eligible recipients is simply to distribute available shares by lottery.
Although a lottery offers the only fair resolution among conflicting
values, it encounters great resistance from the public and profes-
160 See William A. Knaus, Criteria for Admission to Intensive Care Units, in
RATIONING OF MEDICAL CARE FOR THE CRITICALLY ILL, supra note 159, at 44, 44-51
(suggesting a framework for controlling admission to intensive care); Knaus et al.,
supra note 30, at 389 (recommending the use of probability estimates to guide clinical
decisions).
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sionals who prefer criteria of worthiness for these extraordinarily
expensive decisions. If we choose to discriminate among recipients
on some worthiness criteria, it is imperative that this be done by a
fair and legitimate process that incorporates a wide range of
competing viewpoints.
CONCLUSION
Societies will expend enormous resources to rescue persons
trapped in a mine, lost at sea, and on many other accidental
occasions. Such rescues are symbolic, affirming the value of life and
the commitment of the community to individuals in distress. It
seems likely that if such accidents occurred more routinely, the
intensity of these rescue efforts would diminish. Similarly, many
new medical techniques begin as rescues and have major symbolic
as well as research significance, but as these dramatic rescue efforts
become viable for larger populations of patients they raise imposing
allocation questions. A heart-lung transplant may cost well over a
hundred thousand dollars initially with subsequent yearly costs of
approximately $50,000.161 Our capacity to carry out very few
rescues has little impact on the health care system as a whole, but
if many thousands were possible the situation would change.
Rescues eventually become viable as "conventional care," and
great pressures develop to insure for them. Had policy-makers
realized the cost of covering ESRD under Medicare they would have
entered this arena more carefully. It was inevitable that dialysis
coverage would have been extended because in the American
context, with its emphasis on the worth of the individual, the notion
of rescue carries great weight. Once the capability is acquired,
there is extensive public pressure to use it if life is at stake. Given
this reality, some have suggested that we should focus our research
and development investments on cost-effective technologies
162
and on those that are cost-saving.1 63 It remains unclear that this
would be politically viable given public attitudes and the pressures
161 See Richard Saltus, Heart-Lung Transplant First in State, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
1, 1992, at A25, A27 (quoting the Cooperative Transplantation Study's finding that
"median charges for heart-lung transplants [are] $134,881").
162 See CALLAHAN, supra note 16, at 126 (noting the need to "cut the fat" in
expenditures on new technology in light of the aging U.S. population).
163 See Kenneth E. Warner, Effects of Hospital Cost Containment on the Development
and Use of Medical Technology, 56 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 187, 196-204 (1978)
(describing various proposals to control technological costs including a ceiling on
capital expenditures).
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from the various constituencies who have a major stake in current
research and technological developments.
The question of how long American society can delay coming to
terms with the rationing issue in an open manner remains unan-
swered. Each year, as costs mount and new possibilities accelerate,
the notion that we can muddle along in the usual way becomes less
tenable. Even if such strategies as those represented in the Oregon
Plan were feasible on a broad scale, a conclusion undermined by the
exclusions negotiated in Oregon's political process, 164 it is not
clear that the decisions can be implemented successfully in a
manner that makes sense clinically. Helping is a holistic process,
not easily divided into artificial categories of care. Medicine cannot
ignore caring without destroying much of the value and significance
of the therapeutic encounter. Given these realities, it seems most
reasonable for society to set whatever constraints on medical care
expenditures are politically necessary and leave micro-decisions to
negotiations between patients and health professionals. These
decisions, however, should be carried out in a context of universal
health care in which the entire population has access to a basic,
decent, minimal standard of care.
164 See Lawrence D. Brown, The National Politics of Oregon's Rationing Plan,
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 28, 35 (reporting criticism that because Oregon's
"coalition-building strategy" exempted Medicaid recipient groups with powerful
lobbies from rationing, services for the remaining 70 percent of recipients were
limited to 30 percent of the budget).
